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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-OUSTING JURISDICTION OF COURTS-VALIDITY.-GITLER = AL.
v. RUSSIA Co. ET AL., io6 N. Y. Supp. 886.-Held, that a stipulation in a con-
tract between a foreign corporation and a resident of New York State by
which it was agreed not to sue in the New York courts was invalid as an
attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts.
Stipulations in contracts made by persons domiciled in the same State
limiting the venue to a certain county have been held invalid as against pub-
lic policy and tending to oust courts of their jurisdiction; Nute v. Hamilton
Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 174; Boynton v. Middlesex Mutual Fird Ins.
Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 212; Healy v. Building Loan Asso., 17 Penn. Sup. Ct.
385; but in Greve v. Aetna Live Stock Ins. Co., 81 Hunter (N. Y.) 28, such
a stipulation was held valid and binding and the court said that the theory
that it was against public policy and an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of
the courts was not worthy of extended notice. This was followed in Heslin
v. Eastern Building & Loan Asso., 28 Misc. (N. Y.) 376, but the former view
appears to have the weight of authority. As to ousting the jurisdiction of
different state courts a stipulation between persons domiciled in different
states of the Union limiting the venue to one state was held void; Reichard
v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 518; agreements not to resort to the Fed-
eral Courts have been held invalid; Doyle v. Cont. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535;
Mutual R. F. Life Asso. v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 Fed. Rep. 508. But
where both parties to a contract were domiciled in Italy a stipulation that all
disputes arising on the contract should be referred to the Florentine courts
in Italy, although the contract was to be performed in the United States
and Canada, was held valid and binding, the court holding there was nothing
unreasonable or contrary to public policy in such a stipulation when the vast
number of jurisdictions through which they must pass in performing the
contracts are considered; Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19.
DAMAGES-INFANTS-PERSONAL INJURY-Loss OF TIME.-HAmmER V.
CAINE, 92 PAC. (WASH.) 44I.-Held, in a personal injury action by a minor
by his mother as guardian ad liten, he may recover for loss of time and
earnings during his minority, since the prosecution of the action by his
mother as guardian ad litem estops her from subsequently making any claim
against defendant therefor.
The services of a minor belong to the parent, Cooley on Torts, Section
135, who alone has a right of action for the loss of minor's services, Wilder
v. Great Western Cereal Co., rog N. W. (Iowa) 789; but the infant may sue
by guardian ad litem for loss of services after majority, Ceigler v. Hopper-
Morgan Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 656, and for a permanent or deforming injury,
Statter v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 200 Mo. 107. Moreover, the infant himself
acquires a right of action for his services during minority when emancipated
by his father's abandonment of him, Southern R. Co. v. Flemister, 12o Ga.
524. So when the parent prosecutes the infant's suit he is presumed to waive
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his own rights in favor of the infant. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Davis, 22
Ky. Law Rep. 1156. Contra, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Morin, 66 Tex. 225.
This presumption is rebutted by proof of a different intention, as by showing
that the parent was simultaneously conducting his own action. Slaughter v.
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 28 Ky. Law. Rep. 665.
INJUNCTION-GROUNDS-UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH ANOTHER'S Busi-
NESs.-RocKY MOUNTAIN BELL TELEPHONE CO. V. MONTANA FEDERATION OF
LABOR, i56 FED. 8Og. During a strike a labor union issued circulars which
described a company as "unfair" and a "legalized highwayman," urged people
not to enter its employ or to patronize it, and stated that union members
had decided to withdraw their trade from merchants who used the com-
pany's telephones. Held, that the commission of such acts by a labor union
constituted unlawful conspiracy to interfere with the business of another,
and would be enjoined.
Capital or labor can form combinations for the mutual benefit of mem-
bers, provided force, threats, or intimidation are not used to effect such pur-
poses. Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. i89; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass.
92. But in some cases peaceable persuasion can be distinguished from coer-
cion only with great difficulty. Thus a merchants' association can withdraw its
trade from a wholesaler to compel him to stop dealing with outsiders.
Montgomery, Ward & Co. v. South Dakota, etc., Association, 15o Fed. 413.
But a union cannot strike to gain exclusive control of a trade. Pickett v.
Walsh, 192 Mass. 572; Erdman v. Mitchell, 2o7 Pa. St. 79; O'Brien v. People,
216 Ill. 354. Contra, National Protective Association, etc., v. Cumming, 170
N. Y. 315. The threats or intimidation, however, need not be express, or
even implied, but may be inferred from the attitude of the defendants.
Foster v. Clerks, etc., Association, 78 N. Y. Supp. 86o. In accordance with
these general rules it has been held that strikers may uphold their cause
in circulars or newspapers unless such action amounts to coercion. Beck v.
Ry. Teamsters, etc., Union, 119 Mich. 497; Casey v. Cincinnati Typ. Union,
45 Fed. 135. In England numerous statutes have been passed regulating
the activities of labor unions. Lyons v. Wilkins, i Ch. [i896] 8i.
JURY-COMPETENCY OF JURORS-RELATIONSHIP TO PARTY INTERESTED.-
LANSOUVER V. GLENBYON DYE WORKS, 68 ATL. (R. I.) 545.-Held, that an
employee of a stockholder of a corporation is not by reason of his employ-
ment disqualified as a juror in a case to which the corporation is a party.
This case has no precedent in the United States, but the same question
was decided in the same way in Frederickton Boom Co. v. McPherson, 13
N. Bruns. 8. Several business relations existing between a juror and a party
to the suit conclusively disqualify the juror. For example, the relation of
employer and employee. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738. The
employer may be a corporation. Burnett v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., i6
Neb. 332. The relation of landlord and tenant makes a juror incompetent.
Hathaway v. Helmer, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 29. Arnold v. Producers' Fruit Co.,
141 CaL 738, contra. Other disqualifying relations are that of master and
servant; State v. Cella, 3 Wash. 99; and that of partnership; Stumm v. Hum-
tell, 39 Iowa, 478. A party's attorney or client is incompetent; 3 BI. Comm.
363; but not the client of an attorney in the suit. McCorkle v. Mallory, 30
Wash. 632. Other business relations do not conclusively disqualify, but may
YALE LAW JOURNAL
be judged likely or unlikely to influence the verdict. Thus, one who man-
ufactured articles for a company with which a party was connected was held
to be incompetent as a juror. Laidlaw v. Sage, 37 N. Y. Supp. 77o. But
the mere relation of debtor and creditor between a party and a juror does not
disqualify the juror. Thompson v. Douglass, 35 W. Va. 337.
JURY-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-WAIVER OF JURY.-JENNINGS V. STATE,
114 N. W. 492 (Wis.)-Held, one pleading not guilty to an information
charging felony or misdemeanor cannot, in the absence of a statute confer-
ring the right, waive a jury, nor waive a right to trial by a common-law jury
of twelve jurors. Marshall, J., dissenting.
At common law a jury was an essential part of any court which had
jurisdiction to try persons charged by indictment and could not be waived.
Paulsen v. People, 195 Ill. 507. While in civil cases the right to a jury trial
is a mere privilege for the benefit of the litigants which may be waived, Baird
v. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 382, in criminal cases the court is without jurisdiction in
the absence of a jury, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. State
v. Maine, 27 Conn. 281. In some States the rule does not apply to trials for
misdemeanors. State v. Alderton, 5o W. Va. ioi; Levi v. State, 4
Baxt. (Tenn.) 289. Consistently, when the jury trial cannot be waived it
has been held that the c6mmon-law number of jurors cannot be waived.
Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470. Contra,
State v. Kaufman, 51 Ia. 578; Cont. v. Dailey, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 8o. Some
States by statute confer the right to waive. Such statutes have been held not
in conflict with the State constitutions, People v. Noll, 20 Cal. 164; State v.
Abbee, 61 N. H. 42; or with the Constitution of the United States, Hallinger
v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314.
MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRIBUToRY NEGLIGENCE-BURDEN OF PROOF.-
CRAWFORD & MCCRIAMMON Co. v. GosE, 82 N. E. 984 (IND.).-Held, that in an
action against an employer for injuries to an employee, the burden of prov-
ing contributory negligence rests on the employer.
In some jurisdictions the rule seems to be well settled that the burden
is on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of evidence that he was free
from contributory negligence, Connolly v. Waltham, 156 Mass. 368, including
ignorance of defects causing the injury, Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Hill, 112
Ill. App. 475; Belair v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 Iowa, 662; even when the
action is brought under an employer's liability statute with no provisions on
this particular point. Taylor v. Carew Mfg. Co., 143 Mass. 470. Where all
the circumstances attending the accident are in evidence, fair inference will
take the place of positive evidence of plaintff's due care. Tyndale v. Old Col-
ony R. Co., 156 Mass. 503; Vorhees v. Hudson River Tel. Co., io9 N. Y. App.
Div. 465. Still other jurisdictions hold that if the plaintiff proves the master
negligent, he thus throws upon the defendant master the burden of showing
contributory negligence. Godfrey v. Beattyville Coal Co., ioi Ky. 339; John-
ston v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 95 Ia. 685. But in the majority of the states
contributory negligence is regarded as an affirmative defense which must be
proved by the defendant. Bonn v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 82 S. W. 8o8
(Tex.); Boweing v. Wilmington Malleable Iron Co., 66 Atl. 369 (Del.);
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Tynan, I19 Fed. 288; Stewart v. Raleigh & A. Air
Line R. Co., 53 S. E. 877, (N. C.). On the other hand, where contributory
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negligence may be legitimately inferred from the plaintiff's own showing,
defendant need not prove it. New Omaha Thompson-Houston Electric
Light Co. v. Dent, 68 Neb. 668.
MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S NEGLECT OF STATUTORY DUTY-EFFECr
ON SERVANT'S ASSUMPTION OF RiSx.-UNITED STATES CSMENT CO. V. COOPER,
82 N. E. 981 (IN.).-Held, that the doctrine of assumed risk does not apply
where the negligence consists in violating the factory act (Burns' Ann. St.
igol, Section 7o87), providing that machinery shall be guarded.
There is some conflict of authority as to whether a master may avail him-
self of the defense of assumption of risk where the injury complained of
resulted from his neglect of a duty imposed by statute. Where the defense
is forbidden by the statute itself, he cannot of course rely upon it, Southern
R. Co. v. Carson, 194 U. S. 136, and where there is no such inhibition the
weight of authority seems to be to the same effect, Murphy v. Grand Rapids
Veneer Works, io6 N. W. 211 (Mich.); Quackenbush v. Wisconsin, etc., R.
Co., 62 Wisc. 411; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Norgate, 72 C. C. A. 365; even
though the servant knew of the violation of the statute. The extreme case
in this direction declares that assumption of risk would nullify the statute.
Narramore v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., g6 Fed. 298. The contrary doctrine
holds that knowledge of the violation of the statute constitutes a waiver of its
terms and an assumption of risk. Sweeney v. Central Pac. R. Co., 57 Cal.
15; Spiva v. Osage Coal & Mining Co., 88 Mo. 68; Kiernan v. Eidlitz, 1oo
N. Y. Supp. 731. Between these extremes there are several cases holding
that risk through the statutory negligence of the master is only assumed when
the danger is so great that the facing of it amounts to contributory negligence.
Biles v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 139 N. C. 528; Bair v. Heibel, 1O3 Mo.
App. 621. It is a settled rule, however, that if the object of the statute is
other than the protection of the servant, Fleming v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co.,
2 Minn. iII, or if it is merely penal, Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372; Not-
tage v. Sawmill Phonix, 133 Fed. 979, the master's neglect of the duty
imposed will not prevent his relying on the servant's assumption of risk.
RAILROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENT-PROXIMATE CAUSE.-LouIsvILuP & N.
R. Co. v. ARMSTRONG, 105 S. W. 473 (KY.).-Held, that where a team was
frightened by the carcass of a horse lying on the defendant's right of way,
near a road, the killing of the horse by one of the defendant's trains was
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries resulting from the fright
of the team.
In Behling v. S. W. Penn. Pipe Lines, i6o Pa. St. 359, a proximate cause
is defined as one which in natural sequence, undisturbed by any independent
cause, produces the result complained of. The negligent and unlawful leav-
ing of any obstruction on or near the right of way and within the highway,
although without the traveled portion, in such a manner as to frighten teams
of ordinary docility, will make the company liable for damages resulting
from such fright. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kitley, i18 Ind. 152;
Jones v. Housatonic R. Co., io7 Mass. 261; Harrell v. Albemarle & P. R. R.
Co., 11O N. C. 215; Palys v. Jewett, 32 N. J. Eq. 302. But, to recover, the
onus of proving the negligence of the defendant rests upon the plaintiff.
Indianapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Evans, 88 Ill. 63. And he must show that the
defendant knew, or by the use of ordinary care could have-known, of the
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presence of such obstruction on its right of way in time to have removed
it before the plaintiff was injured. Baxter v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co.,
87 Ia. 488. But the negligence of the defendant is not the proximate cause
and in no way contributed to the accident, but was merely concurrent with
it. Selleck v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co., 58 Mich. I95; Bosko v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. Co., 36 N. Y. Supp. 261.
RAILROADS-DUTY TO LOOK AND LISTEN-SIGNAL FROM FLAGMAN.-UNION
PACIFIc R. Co. v. ROSEWATER, 157 FED. i68.-Held, that the placing of gates or
the stationing of flagmen at railroad crossings in a city is not a duty imposed
by statute or municipal ordinance on railroad companies, or voluntarily
assumed by them, for the purpose of relieving the traveler on the street from
taking those precautions for his own safety required by the long-settled rule
of law, but as an additional precaution to meet the increased peril resulting
from local conditions in cities; and open gates, or a signal from a flagman to
cross, does not relieve a traveler from the duty to look and listen before enter-
ing upon the tracks.
A failure to stop, look, and listen before crossing an unguarded railway
track is evidence of negligence. Schofield v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 114 U. S.
615. And according to the Pennsylvania rule it is negligence per se which
will bar recovery, unless it affirmatvely appears that it did not approximately
contribute to the injury. Penna. R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. St. 504; Philadelphia,
etc., R. Co. v. Hogeland, 66 Md. i49. But where the guard stationed at the
crossing directs the traveler to cross, in no jurisdiction is the failure to stop,
look, and listen, negligence as a matter of law. It is a question of fact for
the jury. Conaty v. New York, etc., R. Co., 164 Mass. 572; Kane v. Railroad,
132 N. Y. i6o. And in Ohio the Supreme Court of the State has taken a
more emphatic position by declaring that an open gate, with the gateman in
charge, is notice of a clear track and safe crossing; and it is not negligence
to pass upon the tracks without stopping to listen. Railroad v. Schneider, 45
Ohio St. 678.
TORT-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY-INTEREST IN PLAcE.-HoLLIS v. KANSAS
CITY Mo. RETAIL MERCHANT'S Ass'N ET AL., 103 S. W. (Mo.) 32. Where an
association gave a street fair in which an amusement company furnished their
appliances for amusements, including gondolas, similar to a merry-go-round,
under a contract by which the fees for riding on the gondolas collected by
the company were divided between the association and the company, and
where the association had general charge of all the grounds and took an
active part in distributing advertisements of the amusements, held, that the
association, as well as the company, was liable for an injury to one who was
riding on the gondolas, caused by negligence in the construction, operation
and management thereof.
The duty which is incident to the ownership of premises imposes an obli-
gation not only that the proprietor shall not so use them, or create such con-
ditions thereon that danger to others will result, but that he shall not permit
third persons so to use them as to create such conditions thereon. Boston
Beef Packing Co. v. Stevens, 12 Fed. 279; Bohier v. Dienhart Harness
Co., i9 Ind. App. 489; Kelly v. Cohoes Knitting Co., 8 N. Y. App. Div. 156.
Where a person owes a duty with reference to the safety of premises, struct-
ures, or appliances, he cannot excuse himself from performance by showing
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a contract with third parties to keep the premises in repair, or a duty on
someone else as well to do so. Boston v. Coon, 175 Mass. 283; King v.
Heib, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 797; Steppe v. Alter, 48 La. Ann. 363. English
decisions support this doctrine. Marney v. Scott, 68 L. J. 0. B. 736; Wettor
v. Dunk, 4 F. & F. 298. Dominion over or control of articles or premises
is, in general, sufficient to raise a duty that they shall not be so used or
employed as to be likely to injure others. This rule is supported inferen-
tially by Hollard v. N. Y., 16 Daly, 124, and directly by Empire Laundry
Machine Co. v. Brady, 164 Ill. 8.
